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1DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: AN EMERGING 
CUSTOMARY NORM?
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
‘A great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we all know, 
is the revolutionary idea that the people, not governments, are sovereign. This principle has, in 
(the last) decade, . . . acquired the force of historical necessity . . . Democracy today is 
synonymous with legitimacy the world over; it is, in short, the universal value of our time.’1
INTRODUCTION
International law has traditionally regarded the peoples of the world as being represented 
in the international arena by the governments in de facto control of their respective states. 
Except where such governments are imposed by foreign invasion or conduct themselves 
in ways inimical to international peace and security, these governments are conventionally 
deemed worthy of respect and protection under international law - in particular, respect 
regarding ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’2 and protection 
‘from the threat or use of force’.3 The method by which a government of domestic origin 
achieves or retains power was not ordinarily thought of as a basis for withholding such 
protection. As US Chief Justice Taft ruled in the Tinoco Arbitration, 4  the domestic 
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     Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No 1240, Panama: A Just Cause (1990) 2 statement of Luigi R 
Einaudi, US Permanent Representative to the OAS.
2 Charter of the United Nations art 2(7).
3 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4).
4 Tinoco Concession Case, (Great Britain v Costa Rica) 1 RIAA (1923) 369, 381-382 reprinted in (1924) 
18 AmerJInt’lL, 147 at 154.
2constitutionality of the seizure of power is considered beyond the scope of international 
concern: 
‘The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its administration 
under constitutional limitations established by the people during the incumbency of the 
government it has overthrown. The question is, has it really established itself in such a way 
that all within its influence recognise its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming 
to be a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government within its own 
jurisdiction?’5
Four decades later, amidst the creation of the United Nations and its provisions trumpeting 
the right of citizenry to participation and the protection of this right by international law, 
the principle still held sway and was to hold sway way into the future. In 1961, Professor 
Hans Kelsen restated the principle as follows: 
‘Under what circumstances does a national legal order begin or cease to be valid? The answer, 
given by international law, is that a national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has 
become - on the whole - efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy 
…The Government brought into permanent power by a revolution or coup d’etat is, according 
to international law, the legitimate government of the state, whose identity is not affected by 
these events.’6
5 Tinoco Concession Case, (Great Britain v Costa Rica) 1 RIAA (1923) 369, 381-382 reprinted in (1924) 
18 AmerJInt’lL, 147 at 154.
6
      Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg translation). New York: Russell, 
1961, 220-221.
3During the Cold War, it was nearly impossible for the international community as a whole 
to agree both that a particular state was undemocratic and that international action should 
be taken against that state. The single exception concerned the process of decolonisation. 
A consensus gradually developed within the United Nations that the denial of majority 
self-rule in the colonial territories of Africa and Asia should be treated as an international 
delict.7 When white minority regimes in South Africa and elsewhere resisted the transition 
to majority rule, states could agree, within the context of the United Nations system, to 
apply economic and diplomatic sanctions. 8  By defining apartheid regimes as per se 
violative of international law,9  states could treat the character of the white minority 
governments as a legitimate subject for international action, without exposing all 
undemocratic regimes to similar scrutiny and pressure.
It is significant that in the case of South African diplomatic credentials were denied on the 
basis of the internal character of the regime. Through its de jure violations of one of the 
Charter of the United Nation’s few unambiguous and broadly supported norms of racial 
equality, the South African Government subjected itself to ever-increasing scrutiny and 
disapproval from the General Assembly, embodied in innumerable resolutions, including 
refusals to take action on credentials. These measures culminated in the passage by the 
General Assembly of a resolution declaring that the South African regime had no right to 
represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by the 
Organisation of African Unity were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming 
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and Apartheid’ (1996) 19 Fordham International Law Journal, 1464 at 1472-1488 discussing the 
comprehensive global campaign launched against apartheid in South Africa.
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      Gassama, I. ‘Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and 
Apartheid’ (1996) 19 Fordham International Law Journal, 1464 at 1480-1488. 
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      Gassama, I. ‘Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and 
Apartheid’ (1996) 19 Fordham International Law Journal, 1464 at 1478-1480.
4majority of the South African people.10 The resolution went on to request all specialized 
agencies and other intergovernmental organisations to deny membership or privileges of 
membership to the South African regime and to invite, in consultation with the 
Organisation of African Unity, representatives of the liberation movements of the South 
African people recognized by the organisation to participate in their meetings.11  The 
general consensus regarding the illegality of the South African regime was an exception 
as the history of United Nations credentials controversies in the Cold War era attests. It is 
instructive that the international community’s views in this era regarding regime 
legitimacy were generally permissive and often international recognition of governments 
favoured the government (whether legitimate or illegitimate) in effective power rather 
than some seemingly legitimate putative authority.12 This was notwithstanding General 
Assembly passed Resolution 396, passed shortly after the United Nations was created. 
This Resolution states clearly that: 
‘whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a 
Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in 
the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case’13
10 Situation in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid. GA Res 3151(G), UN GAOR, 28th 
sess, Supp No 30, [11], UN Doc A/9030 (1973).
11 Situation in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid. GA Res 3151(G), UN GAOR, 28th 
sess, Supp No 30, [13], UN Doc A/9030 (1973).
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    The United Nations has known eight significant credentials contests involving China, Hungary, Congo 
(Leopoldville), Yemen, Cambodia (1973-1974 and post-1978), South Africa and Israel. The de facto 
regime was denied credentials in the cases of China (1950-1971), Hungary (1957-1963), Cambodia 
(post-1978) and South Africa (1974), and narrowly prevailed in the case of Cambodia in 1973-1974. 
For a concise discussion of this see: Roth, B. ‘Government Illegitimacy Revisited: “Pro-Democratic” 
Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar World’ (1993) Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 48 at 495-499.
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5Though the idea that the international community can protect human rights was one of the 
great practical achievements manifested in the Charter of the United Nations with 
international law at the vanguard of giving tangible expression to the rights, the Cold War 
tied the issue to ideological and revolutionary agendas. ‘Common interest’ and ‘common 
good’ were seen as nothing more than a diplomatic screen hiding the avaricious and 
predatory aims of the imperialist Powers.14 The effect of this position was to strengthen 
sovereignty considerations as the United Nations became a ground for cultivating the 
agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the appearance of the ‘Third World’ as a 
force in the years after World War II. Realpolitik not law was the governing force in the 
Cold War era with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations frozen 
on paper and rarely seen in practice. 
The end of the Cold War, which paralysed the United Nations from its inception, was a 
cause for celebration and hope. In the early 1990s, Western leaders congratulated 
themselves over the end of communism and the fall of the Soviet empire. Following the 
historic Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction ‘among 
nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great 
objectives of the Charter of the United Nations - a United Nations capable of maintaining 
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in 
the words of the Charter of the United Nations, “social progress and better standards of 
life in larger freedom”.’15
14
    See: Korovin, I. ‘Respect for Sovereignty: An Unchanging Principle of Soviet Foreign Policy’ (1956) 
International Affairs (Moscow), 11 at 32, 37-9.
15
    Boutros-Ghali, B. Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, UN GAOR, 47th 
sess, [3], UN Doc A/47/277, S/24111 (1992).
6New challenges arising from the strengthening of international human rights norms and 
the seemingly unprecedented spirit of international cooperation accompanied the end of 
bipolar geostrategic and ideological confrontation. The end of the Cold War witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the number, diversity and proportion of states formally committed to 
democratic principles.16 Many states also displayed a greater willingness to countenance 
foreign intervention in the name of democracy and human rights.17 On the one hand, 
liberal-democratic political values increased immensely in prestige in the wake of the 
collapse of the Communist Party states of Eastern Europe. 18  On the other hand, 
dictatorships that, for political or geostrategic reasons, were once able to count on an 
automatic constituency on one or the other side of the bipolar divide suddenly found 
themselves vulnerable to broad international disapprobation. Whereas coups d’etat and 
rigged elections in the Cold War era were considered business-as-usual, they were now 
candidates for concerted international response, not implausibly extending as far as 
internationally sanctioned armed intervention.19 But in many respects, the rhetoric in this 
area outpaced reality. Although various forms of intervention to promote democracy may 
be more politically palatable than in the past,20 a broadly accepted content of democracy is 
yet to emerge.
16
    See: Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 539 at 540.
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    See: Acevedo, D. ‘The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting 
Democracy’ IN Damrosch, L. (ed) Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 119 at 141 recognizing that ‘the notion that the 
illegal replacement of a democratically elected government is still a matter essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of its member states, and thus immune from international scrutiny, is no longer 
the axiomatic precept it once was’.
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    In the words of Carl Gershman: ‘It has to be remembered that until recently there was a strong feeling 
that there was an alternative out there to Western liberal democracy. There was a belief in a higher form 
of democracy, one that emphasised results, equality, that could really achieve things.’ Quoted in: 
Bernstein, R. ‘New Issues Born from Communism’s Death Knell’ New York Times, 31 August 1991, 
11.
19
    Roth, B. ‘Government Illegitimacy Revisited: ‘ “Pro-Democratic” Armed Intervention in the Post-
Bipolar World’ (1993) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 48 at 483.
20
    See: Acevedo, D. ‘The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting 
Democracy’ IN Damrosch, L. (ed) Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 119 at 141.
7In the early days of the post-Cold War era, prominent international law scholars were 
emphatic that representative government was an emerging international legal 
entitlement.21 International civil servants joined the mounting chorus proclaiming a new-
shared consensus that democracy, human rights, and peace are inextricably linked. With 
routine announcements by Heads of state of their fealty to democratic norms, and 
insistence that leaders of other states do so as well, democracy was finally at the heart of 
the international agenda. 22 International organisations passed numerous resolutions 
announcing that governmental legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed, and 
conditioned membership in their organisations on acceptance of democratic principles.23
Even developing countries, once near monolithic in their opposition to any external 
involvement in domestic politics, began to commonly seek international legitimacy 
through external monitoring and even supervision of their electoral processes.24 While the 
mantra ‘democracy is an idea whose time has come’ was loudly trumpeted in the last 
21
    See: Franck, T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 47 
arguing that representative democracy is gradually evolving from moral prescription to an international 
legal obligation in part based on custom and in part on the collective interpretation of treaties; Contrast: 
Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 539 at 540-541 noting that the number of democratic governments has increased 
from nine to over sixty-five countries since the turn of the century.
22
    Wippman, D. ‘Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention’ (1997) 19 Houston Journal of 
International Law, 659 at 661-662.
23
    For example: The Council of Europe makes democracy a pre-condition for membership. See: ‘Statute of 
the Council of Europe’, 5 May 1949, art 3, 87 UNTS, 103 at 106. Similarly, the OAS Charter now 
provides for the suspension from the General Assembly of any member state whose ‘democratically 
constituted government has been overthrown by force’. See: ‘Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of 
the Organisation of American States’, 14 December 1992, art 9, (1992) 33 ILM 1005 (‘Protocol of 
Washington’) while not ratified by all OAS member states yet, this protocol amends the OAS Charter; 
Cerna, C. ‘Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?’ (1995) 
NYU Journal of International law and Policy, 289 at 293.
24
    See: Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 539 at 541; See Acevedo, D. ‘The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of 
Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy’ IN Damrosch, L. (ed) Enforcing Restraint: Collective 
Intervention in Internal Conflicts. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 119 at 119-120 
noting that the presence of monitors from the OAS and the United Nations legitimised Aristide’s 
government when he won the election in Haiti. This trend began in 1989, when the Nicaraguan 
Government invited both the United Nations and the Organisation of American States to help supervise 
its electoral process in order to verify the validity of the 1990 elections. See: Fox, G. ‘The Right to 
Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law, 539 at 579-
580.
8decade of the 20th century, the content of democracy - its criteria and benchmarks - still 
remains bogged down in a quagmire of political and human rights discourse.
Though states are increasingly willing to embrace democratic ideals, the precise 
understanding of democracy continues to languish in uncertainty. The uncertainties are no 
surprise. The international community has long paid lip service to basic principles of 
democratic governance but it has proven extremely difficult to translate this agreement on 
basic principles into a consensus on the content of democracy. In part, this is because at 
the global level the principles at issue have been stated at a high level of generality - high 
enough to mask important substantive differences among states on the content of those 
principles. 
‘As a result, large numbers of states have been able to sign on to international instruments 
proclaiming support for democracy and associated values, without any real agreement on the 
meaning of democracy or the means by which it should be given effect. Such differences 
among states surface when concrete measures are contemplated in specific cases.’25
Even when states agree on the kinds of changes necessary to initiate or restore democracy 
in a particular country, they may disagree sharply on the role the international community 
should play in seeking such changes. Such differences reflect strong philosophical and 
political differences over the extent to which external actors may legitimately seek 
changes in the domestic politics of other states. In practice, therefore, cases in which 
broad international agreement on measures to be taken against undemocratic regimes can 
be achieved are the exception rather than the rule. 
25
    Wippman, D. ‘Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention’ (1997) 19 Houston Journal of 
International Law, 659 at 664.
9Democratic entitlement as a universal human right is a complex and multifaceted issue. 
The Article has as its modest aim a general reflection on the enshrinement of democracy 
as a universal entitlement and the movement of international law in a pro-democratic 
direction The Article will seek to highlight the general uncertainties that continue to 
plague the democratic entitlement. The Article deliberately focuses on the United Nations 
system with reference also being given to regional efforts. The Article does not discuss 
the legal justifications and nature of measures to address undemocratic regimes. While 
such measures are significant in pro-democratic discourse, it is beyond the scope of the 
Article’s general aim of exposing the thorny issues that surround democratic entitlement 
as a universal right.
GRAPPLING WITH THE DEMOCRACY QUESTION
Within the United Nations system, broad statements in support of democratic governance 
date back to 1948, when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by consensus.26 A number of articles in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights substantiate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the rights of 
the citizenry in member states. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations
contain specific provisions in this respect. Article 55(c) of the Charter of the United 
Nations commits the Organisation to the promotion of ‘universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion’.27 Under Article 56, ‘All Members pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of 
26
    See: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN Doc A/810 (1948).
27 Charter of the United Nations art 55(c).
10
the purposes set forth in Article 55’. 28  Although falling far short of authorizing 
intervention, unilateral or multilateral, to compel compliance with human rights standards, 
these provisions do make clear that the pursuit of human rights does not, as such, 
constitute intervention ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’29
under Article 2(7). 
The United Nations has promulgated instruments that are collectively equivalent to an 
International Bill of Rights30 and helped gather international consensus for the idea that 
the populations of States have rights under international law. This extends to the 
protection of the rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has 
constructed a normative framework for the realisation of rights for the people.31 The 
framework has been sustained over time by the actions of States in signing and ratifying 
various international human rights and related instruments, some of which are now part of 
customary international law. The international collaborative efforts involving United 
Nations organs, human rights workers and others have helped publicise the plight of the 
oppressed millions who yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary 
detention, execution and political purges.
Among the human rights deemed fit objects of international concern is the right of 
political participation. This right was embodied in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as follows: 
28 Charter of the United Nations art 56.
29 Charter of the United Nations art 2(7).
30
    The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols.
31
    See: United Nations Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Human Rights and Elections: Handbook 
on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, United Nations Doc HR/p/ot/2 (1994).
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‘1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’32
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government,’ and that ‘this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections’. 33  Implicitly, then, Article 21 links governmental 
legitimacy to respect for the popular will. But this linkage does not appear in the 
subsequent, and legally binding, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(‘ICCPR’).34 Article 25 of the ICCPR speaks of the right to participate in public affairs, 
including the right to genuine and periodic elections, but it does not purport to condition 
governmental authority on respect for the will of the people.35 The language of Article 25 
was intentionally drafted broadly enough to accommodate the wide range of governmental 
systems in place among the initial parties to the ICCPR.36 As a result, even Soviet-bloc 
states felt free to ratify the ICCPR.37 From their perspective, communist states satisfied 
the requirements of Article 25 by affording voters access to various participatory 
mechanisms as well as an opportunity to ratify their leadership in periodic, albeit single-
32 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 21.
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 21.
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
(1966) 6 ILM 368.
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 25.
36
    See: Steiner, H. ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book,
77 at 87-88, 90, 93.
37
    Steiner, H. ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book, 77 at 
91 noting that an amendment requiring a pluralist political party system was withdrawn as a concession 
to the Soviet Union.
12
party, elections.38 Thus, the cost of consensus was language broad enough to obscure 
sharp differences among states on the nature of their commitment to democratic rule.
The differences between the two articulations in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and ICCPR are interesting. As Professor Henry Steiner notes, the: 
‘earlier instrument, influenced to a greater degree than the International Covenant by the 
tradition of liberal democracy, gives more emphasis to the role of the “will of the people” as 
the “basis of the authority of government”.’ 39
‘The main ideological competitors of liberal democracy, adherents of one variant or another 
of Leninist vanguardism, did not, after all, deny the role of popular will as the basis of 
governmental authority; the often-used terms “people’s democracy” and “socialist 
democracy” were affirmations of fidelity to this notion, the revolutionary struggle being the 
ultimate embodiment of the popular will.’40
Roth states:
‘The Declaration’s version is more threatening to non-liberal approaches because it contains, 
at least arguably, an unwelcome nexus between elections and governmental authority.’41
and explains that:
‘Article 21 of the Declaration can be read syllogistically to mean that the basis of 
governmental authority is such popular will as has been expressed in the elections, whereas 
38
    Steiner, H. ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book, 77 at 
93.
39
    Steiner, H. ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book, 77 at 
87.
40 Steiner, H. ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book 77, at 
87.
41
  Roth, B. ‘Government Illegitimacy Revisited: “Pro-Democratic” Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar 
World’ (1993) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 48 at 505.
13
non-liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the popular will is (in some abstract sense) 
the basis of - and therefore expressed by - governmental authority, and is also expressed in 
elections. The Covenant version simplifies the matter by leaving undefined the relationship, if 
any, not only between authority and elections, but also between authority and participation.’42
Tragically, outside of the decolonisation context, during the Cold War era, there was little 
international consensus on the requirements of democratic governance beyond the general 
but limited insistence on periodic and genuine elections found in the ICCPR and a number 
of other international legal instruments. As a result, states lacked generally accepted 
criteria by which to judge other states’ compliance with substantive democratic 
principles.43 With the end of the bi-polar ideological competition that characterized the 
Cold War, 44  there has been a widely publicized shift in the character of public 
pronouncements about democracy. More states have made, through treaty or by means of 
non-binding but still influential declarations, formal commitments to democratic 
governance.45 In addition, states, international organisations, human rights tribunals and 
legal scholars have sought increasingly to imbue that commitment with some real content 
to move beyond the simple but vague commitment to free elections contained in the 
ICCPR.46
42
    Roth, B. ‘Government Illegitimacy Revisited: “Pro-Democratic” Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar 
World’ (1993) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 48 at 505. It should be recalled that the 
Covenant embodies a ‘legal’ commitment, whereas the Declaration was understood as embodying 
merely a ‘political’ commitment. If the legal commitment that states have made since 1966 falls short of 
the political commitment made in 1948, it is difficult to argue that states should now be held legally 
accountable to the greater commitment.
43
    See: Franck, T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 47 
discussing the problems associated with examining and monitoring elections for compliance with the 
existing ambiguous standards.
44
    Fox, G. and Nolte, G. ‘Intolerant Democracies’ (1995) HarvInt’lLJ, 1 at 5.
45
    See for example: ‘Joint Communique of United States-Mexico Binational Commission.’ 7 August 1989. 
(1990) 29 ILM, 18; ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow 
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect For Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, 
The Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding.’ 3 October 1991. (1991) 30 ILM, 1670 (‘Moscow 
Document’).
46
    See: Fox, G. and Nolte, G. ‘Intolerant Democracies’ (1995) Harvard International Law Journal, 1 at 3-
5 describing efforts of ‘the international community to address the perennial question of what makes a 
state “democratic”.
14
The democracy discourse however remains ‘straitjacketed’ by Article 2(7) of the Charter 
of the United Nations which prohibits intervention in the “domestic affairs” of other 
states. This Article remains a pillar of the Charter of the United Nations system and 
continues to cast a shadow over all debates relating to government legitimacy or 
illegitimacy. Accordingly, although many states have joined the promulgation of 
resolutions and declarations proclaiming support for democracy and the right of political 
participation,47 they also stress that each state has the ‘sovereign right freely to choose and 
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform 
to the preferences of other states’.48 Though the international community may, under 
Articles 55 and 56, promote state observance of the right of citizens to participate in their 
governance, there is no clear authority to mandate a particular allocation of decision-
making power within a sovereign state. In any event, an election’s ‘genuineness’ as 
referred to by both participation provisions, has no obvious criteria. 
In a bid to give the participation provisions content and contour, in December 1988, the 
General Assembly called on the United Nations Human Rights Commission ‘to consider 
appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic 
and genuine elections,’ albeit ‘in the context of full respect for the sovereignty of Member 
States’.49 The result adopted by the Economic and Social Council in May 1989 was a 
‘framework for future efforts,’ the first heading of which was: ‘The will of the people 
expressed through periodic and genuine elections as the basis for the authority of 
47
    See for example: Bell, D. ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West 
Dialogue’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly, 641 at 656 noting that most East Asian states endorsed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ‘for pragmatic, political reasons and not because of a 
deeply held commitment to the human rights norms it contains’.
48 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections. GA Res 45/150, UN 
GAOR 3d Comm, 45th sess, Supp No 49A, UN Doc A/45/766 (1990) at 255.
49 GA Res 157, 43rd Sess, UN Doc A/RES/43/157 (1988).
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government’,50 a phrase that clears up the above-mentioned ambiguity in Article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The document included mention of ‘the right of 
citizens of a State to change their governmental system through appropriate constitutional 
means’, and ‘the right of candidates to put forward their political views, individually and 
in cooperation with others’, and the need for ‘independent supervision’ of elections.51
Two years later, the General Assembly, with only eight dissenting votes, declared: 
‘that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process that provides an equal 
opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political views, 
individually and in co-operation with others’. 52
It nonetheless immediately added the words, ‘as provided in national constitutions and 
laws’53 and further recognized: 
‘that the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of 
periodic and genuine elections shall not call into question each State’s sovereign right freely 
to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they 
conform to the preferences of other states.’54
The net result, albeit limited, is a strengthening of the participation norm. More 
concretely, as a result of agreements among contending forces, the UN became involved 
50 Report of the Economic and Social Council: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic 
and Genuine Elections, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, UN Doc A/44/454 (1989) 2.
51 Report of the Economic and Social Council: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic 
and Genuine Elections, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, at 1, 2, UN Doc A/44/454 
(1989) 2.
52
    GA Res 45/150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990) para 3.
53
    GA Res 45/150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990) para 3.
54 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections. GA Res 45/150, UN 
GAOR 3d Comm, 45th sess, Supp No 49A, UN Doc A/45/766 (1990) at [4]. A second resolution, 
passed over the dissenting votes of twenty-nine nations (mostly Western democracies), reiterated in 
even stronger terms the norm of non-interference in national electoral processes: Respect for the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral 
processes. GA Res 45/151, UN GAOR, 45th Sess, Supp No 49A at 255 UN Doc A/45/49 (1990).
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in election monitoring in member states including Haiti, Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola and 
Cambodia. In a sign that the United Nations was moving towards granting the concept of 
democracy content and contour, the mandate accorded the observer mission in the 
Nicaraguan case included: 
‘(a) To verify that political parties are equitably represented in the Supreme Electoral Council 
and its subsidiary bodies (nine regional electoral councils and 4,100 electoral boards). 
(b) To verify that political parties enjoy complete freedom of organisation and mobilization, 
without hindrance or intimidation by anyone. 
(c) To verify that all political parties have equitable access to State television and radio in 
terms of both the timing and the length of broadcasts. 
(d) To verify that electoral rolls are properly drawn up.’55
Thus, far from merely verifying the honesty of the vote count, the United Nations mission 
in Nicaragua undertook to oversee intricate details not only of the electoral mechanism 
but of the contextual conditions. Although the United Nations presence came at the 
request of a sovereign government, and could not have been imposed in ordinary 
circumstances even under a permissive reading of Article 2(7), activities of this nature 
cannot but identify the United Nations with evolving norms of electoral legitimacy. 
In yet another significant move in the early days of the post-Cold War era, support for 
democracy became increasingly identified with the maintenance of peace and security. 
The reaction to the 29 September 1991 Haitian coup seemed to evidence that the norm of 
popular participation was coming into its own as an international index of governmental 
legitimacy, at least where the international community has already become enmeshed 
55 The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiative. GA 
Res 44/10, UN GAOR, 44th sess, Annex I, Agenda Item 34, Appendix at 3 UN Doc A/44/375 (1989).
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(through the ‘observer’ function) in domestic processes. Resolution 917 declared that the 
obstruction of the restoration of democracy in Haiti constituted a threat to peace.56 By 
imposing sanctions and authorizing military intervention in order to restore democratic 
rule in Haiti, the Security Council further recognized democracy as an entitlement. The 
Security Council corroborated the claim of a population’s right to be governed by those 
whom they had elected freely, fairly and openly. On the adoption of Resolution 940,57 US 
Representative to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright stated that the resolution’s 
objective was ‘not to impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the power to 
exercise that sovereignty to those who rightfully possessed it and to enable Haiti’, in the 
words of the Charter of the United Nations, to pursue ‘social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom’.58 This echoed the sentiments that had been aired earlier by 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations at the historic 
Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992.59
The UN sanctioned pro-democratic intervention in Haiti was part of the UN’s move to 
assume and implement a bold new agenda - the promotion of democracy and the 
connection between a democratic form of government and protection of human rights. 
‘Demands for democratic participation encouraged international involvement, which in 
turn facilitated democratic elections, resulting in international legitimacy for UN election 
monitoring.’60 The popular claim to free and fair elections brought dramatic changes of 
government in diverse nations around the globe. This demand for participatory rights 
56 SC Res 917, UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3376th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/917 (1994).
57
 SC Res 940, UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3413 mtg, UN Doc S/Res/940 (1994).
58
    Albright, M. Statement by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, addressing the UN Security Council (July 
30, 1994), in Security Council Authorizes Multinational Force ‘To Use All Necessary Means’ To 
Facilitate Departure of Military From Haiti, Return of President Aristide, Federal News Service (1 
August 1994), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File.
59
    Boutros-Ghali, B. Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, UN GAOR, 47th 
sess, [3], UN Doc A/47/277, S/24111 (1992).
60
 Stoelting, D. ‘The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections In Independent Nations’ (1992) 7 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 371, 372-373.
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created international pressure on governments to turn to various international entities 
especially the UN to bolster their democratic credentials through endorsement of their 
domestic elections by external electoral monitors.61
Election monitoring by the UN in independent nations signalled the start of a new foray 
by the UN. UN-monitored elections became one of the most visible manifestations of the 
right of peoples under international law to a democratic form of government. 62
Governments’ recognition that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative 
expectation of the community of states’63 indicated that the norm was undergoing a period 
of definition and realization. 
The 1990s witnessed a number of exciting new developments in the UN as it sought to 
match its democratic rhetoric with the necessary normative and institutional framework. 
In November 1991, the Secretary-General’s guidelines on elections monitoring were 
released.64 In 1992, the General Assembly welcomed the Secretary-General’s plan to 
establish both a focal point and an Electoral Assistance Unit within the Secretariat, and to 
61 Huntington, S. P. The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century, University of 
Oklahoma Press ,1991, 183-85.
62 The legal basis to the right is found in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, ratified by 100 nations: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . . and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have 
access, on general term, of equality, to public service in her country. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (1966) 6 ILM 368.
63 See Franck, T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 64 (Cold 
War impeded ability of Human Rights Committee to enforce participatory rights). During the debates over 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Soviet Government strongly supported a 
concept of sovereignty that would allow a state a free hand within its own borders. Continuation of the 
Discussion on the Draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Report of the Third Committee, UN 
GAOR, 3d Sess, pt 1, 183d mtg. at 924, UN Doc A/777, at 922 (1948) (advocating a view of national 
sovereignty as ‘the right of a state to act according to its own will, never serving as a tool of the policy of 
another State …’).
64 The Guidelines were approved by the General Assembly in December 1991. See GA Res 130, 46th Sess, 
UN Doc A/RES/46/130 (1991).
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establish two trust funds for electoral work.65 The Electoral Assistance Unit came into 
being in 1992.66 The office became a Division in 1994, and is now located within the 
Department of Political Affairs. 67  In 1993, the General Assembly placed electoral 
assistance in the context of democracy promotion by including language on ensuring ‘the 
continuation and consolidation of the democratization process’ in the body of the 
resolution.68 This resolution also addressed some of the practical concerns emerging from 
the United Nations’ new work in the field.69 In 1994, the General Assembly’s resolution 
supporting electoral work linked human rights work and democratization. In 1995, the 
General Assembly passed its standard electoral assistance resolution, with the term 
‘democratization’ in its title.70
In 1998, about a decade after the General Assembly had flagged a new role for the UN in 
seeking to uphold participatory rights of peoples,71 the UN again passed two resolutions. 
65 See GA Res 138, 47th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/47/138 (1992). The two trust funds were the United Nations 
Trust Fund for Elections Observation and the UNDP Trust Fund for Technical Assistance to Electoral 
Processes. See id. The same day, the yearly sovereignty resolution passed. See GA Res 130, 47th Sess, UN 
Doc A/RES/47/130 (1992).
66 See Electoral Assistance Division, Electoral Assistance website (visited 18 May 2003) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs>.
67 See Electoral Assistance Division, Electoral Assistance website (18 May 2003) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs>.
68 GA Res 131, 48th Sess, para 4, UN Doc A/RES/48/131 (1993). The resolution also linked electoral work 
to the maturing human rights framework by recalling and affirming language from the World Conference on 
Human Rights’ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’s recognition that electoral assistance is ‘of 
particular importance in the strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights and the 
strengthening of a pluralistic civil society....’ Id. at preamble.
69 The 1993 resolution stressed the importance of adequate time in carrying out electoral work. It 
recommended that the United Nations ensure pre-election preparatory and post-election follow-up work; it 
called on the focal point to undertake more intensive coordination efforts with other UN organs involved in 
electoral work, especially the Human Rights Centre and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP); and it called for coordination with NGOs. See id. The yearly sovereignty and non-interference 
resolution passed the same day. See GA Res 124, UN GAOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/48/124 (1993).
70 See Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of 
Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democracy, GA Res 185, UN GAOR, 50th Sess, 
Agenda Item 112(b), UN Doc A/RES/50/185 (1996). The 1995 resolution also changed the time frame for 
the Secretary-General’s reporting on electoral matters: instead of a yearly report to the General Assembly, 
he was requested to report back after two years. See id.
71
 See GA Res 146, 44th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/44/146 (1989); GA Res 147, 44th Sess, UN Doc 
A/RES/44/147 (1989).
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The sovereignty resolution remained substantively the same as previous resolutions72 but 
the electoral assistance resolution was broader a sign that this aspect of UN involvement 
in the democratic crusade was coming of age. 73  Despite important developments, a 
bifurcated development continues to persist between the need to enforce democracy as a 
universal norm and the need to guarantee sovereignty of States. This bifurcation opens up 
an avenue for States with concern about shielding their internal policies from UN scrutiny 
especially so in view of the anxiety that the democratic crusade generates among many 
non-Western nations.
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRO-DEMOCRATIC DIRECTION
The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments of multilateralism. The 
Charter of the United Nations under Chapter I, art 1(2), provides that ‘the Purposes of the 
United Nations are . . . to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. 74  Other important 
instruments articulating this right are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states: 
‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’75
72 See UN GAOR 3d Comm., 52d Sess, Agenda Item 112(b), UN Doc A/C.3/52/L.44 (1998) [subsequently 
passed as GA Res 119, 52d Sess, UN Doc A/Res/52/119 (1998)].
73 See UN GAOR 3d Comm., 52d Sess, Agenda Item 112(b), UN Doc A/C.3/52/L.44 (1999) [subsequently 
passed as GA Res 129, 52d Sess, UN Doc A/Res/52/129 (1999)].
74 Charter of the United Nations art 1(2).
75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights .
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: ‘All peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development’.76 Professor 
Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with regional instruments constitute 
‘a net of participatory entitlements’.77 Commentators note that the right to democracy has 
developed within international agreements. Professor Thomas Franck finds that 
democracy, ‘while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly becoming in our time, a 
normative rule of the international system’.78 On his part, Gregory Fox asserts that ‘parties 
to the major human rights conventions have created an international law of participatory 
rights’.79
The assertion that the principle of democracy and the rights which together constitute the 
democratic prerogative are ‘guaranteed in all comprehensive human rights instruments’80
is not empty rhetoric. Infact the greatest progress in specifying the elements of democratic 
governance has been made in regional systems and, in particular, within the OSCE.81 At a 
1990 meeting in Copenhagen, for example, members of the OSCE (then referred to as the 
CSCE) spelled out some of the characteristics of democratic systems and the rule of law.82
76 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, art 1, 993 UNTS 
3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 
ILM, 356 at art 1.
77
    Franck, T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 79.
78
    Franck, T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 46.
79
    Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 539 at 607.
80
    Gregory H Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 86 American Society 
of International Law: Proceedings of the 88th Annual Meeting, 249. See also: Franck, T. ‘The Emerging 
Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46 at 46; Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political 
Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law, 539 at 539.
81
    ‘Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act.’ 1 August 1975. (1975) 14 ILM, 1292 
(‘Helsinki Accords’).
82
    ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension.’ 29 June 1990. (1990) 29 ILM, 1305 (‘Copenhagen Document’).
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This list included: 1) free elections; 2) the need for representative government; 3)
accountability of the executive to an elected legislature or the electorate as a whole; 4) a 
clear separation between the State and political parties; 5) an independent judiciary; 6) 
military and police forces under civilian control; and 7) a panoply of related human 
rights.83
Importantly, in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to the individual, recent 
instruments view democracy as both a keystone of human rights and a necessary condition 
for international peace and security. Reflecting the proliferation of democracies 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Document of Copenhagen84 commits participating 
states to the individual freedoms of democracy, including free elections, representative 
government, government compliance with law and separation between the State and 
political parties. The CSCE’s Charter of Paris 85  pledges to ‘undertake to build, 
consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our 
nations’.86 In addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to every individual, the thirty-
four participating states proclaimed: ‘Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of 
expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each 
person’.87 In the Moscow meeting of the CSCE, participating states asserted that ‘full 
83
    ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension.’ 29 June 1990. (1990) 29 ILM, 1305 at 1308-1309.
84
‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension.’ 29 June 1990. (1990) 29 ILM, 1305 (‘Copenhagen Document’).
85
 ‘Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter.’ 21 November 1990. 
(1991), 30 ILM, 190 (‘Charter of Paris’).
86
    ‘Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter.’ 21 November 1990. 
(1991), 30 ILM, 190 at 193 (‘Charter of Paris’). Leaders of thirty-four participating states of the CSCE 
convened in Paris and adopted the Charter of Paris on 21 November 1990 to initiate ‘a new era of 
democracy, peace and unity’.
87
    ‘Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter.’ 21 November 1990. 
(1991), 30 ILM, 190 at 193 at 194.
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies 
based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for a lasting order of 
peace, security, justice and co-operation in Europe’. 88  Participating states found that 
‘issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are 
of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the 
foundations of the international order’.89
International conferences in the 1990s mirrored the CSCE’s concerns. The Vienna 
Declaration90 of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights ‘considers the 
denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the 
importance of the effective realization of this right’.91 The participating states expressly 
defined self-determination to include a democratic entitlement, noting that it is through 
self-determination that peoples ‘freely determine their political status, and freely pursue 
88
    ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human 
Dimension, Emphasizing Respect For Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, The Rule of Law, and 
Procedures for Fact-Finding.’ 3 October 1991. (1991) 30 ILM, 1670 at 1671-1672 (‘Moscow 
Document’). The Moscow Meeting convened in Moscow from September 10 to October 4, 1991 and 
was attended by representatives of the following participating states of the CSCE: Albania, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and Yugoslavia.
89
    ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human 
Dimension, Emphasizing Respect For Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, The Rule of Law, and 
Procedures for Fact-Finding.’ 3 October 1991. (1991) 30 ILM, 1670 at 1672.
90
‘United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ 
(1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1665 (‘Vienna Declaration’).
91
    ‘United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ 
(1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1665 . The World Conference on Human Rights was assembled in Vienna by 
the United Nations on June 14-25, 1993. Representatives of 171 States attended. The Vienna 
Declaration was adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993: ‘United Nations World Conference on 
Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ (1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1661. The Vienna 
Declaration states that the focus of ‘cooperation, development and strengthening of human rights’ 
should be on ‘strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights, strengthening of a 
pluralistic civil society and the protection of groups which have been rendered vulnerable.’ To this end, 
assistance is necessary for ‘the conduct of free and fair elections, ... the strengthening of the rule of law, 
the promotion of freedom of expression and the administration of justice, and ... the real and effective 
participation of the people in the decision- making processes.’ ‘United Nations World Conference on 
Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ (1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1683.
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their economic, social and cultural development’. 92  The Vienna Declaration further 
affirmed that the ‘World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of 
self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the 
effective realization of this right’.93 The participating states asserted that ‘democracy, 
development and respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing’. Finally, the participating states agreed that ‘democracy is based 
on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, 
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives’.94
Regional initiatives together with the United Nations monitoring of elections have 
clarified the substantive meaning of the emerging right to democracy.95 Gregory Fox lists 
criteria gathered from human rights instruments and United Nations practice in 
monitoring elections that define a free and fair election. These include:
‘1. periodic elections at reasonable intervals; 
2. a secret ballot; 
3. honesty in vote tabulation; 
4. universal suffrage, with minor exceptions permitted for minors, prisoners, the mentally ill, 
and the like; 
92
    ‘United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ 
(1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1665.
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    ‘United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.’ 
(1993) 32 ILM, 1661.
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(1993) 32 ILM, 1661 at 1666.
95
    Fox, G. ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) American Society of 
International Law: Proceedings from the 88th Annual Meeting, 249 at 250-253. See generally: Franck, 
T. ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AmerJInt’lL, 46. United Nations 
monitoring of the elections can involve, as in the case of the United Nations Observer Group for the 
Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), verification of the use of secret ballots, public polling 
places, and voter registration: ‘Haiti Holds Free, Democratic Elections with United Nations Help’ UN 
Chronicle, March 1991 at 62. ONUVEH claimed that ‘in a country that had been traumatized by the 
experience of the election on 29 November 1987, the first task of ONUVEH was to help create a 
psychological climate conducive to the holding of democratic elections.’: ‘Haiti Holds Free, 
Democratic Elections with UN Help’ UN Chronicle, March 1991, 64.
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5. an absence of discrimination against voters and candidates; 
6. freedom to organise and join political parties, which must be given equal access to the 
ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign; 
7. to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all parties to present their 
views through the major media outlets; 
8. supervision of the election by an independent council or commission not tied to any party, 
faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both law and practice.’96
Policy trends of actors in the world community have further encouraged democracy as a 
right. 97  The United Nations has monitored over thirty elections, including those in 
Namibia, Nicaragua and Haiti.98 Several Western European nations have attempted to 
withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies. On a regional level, the 
European Community and the United States have imposed on countries, such as the 
former Yugoslavia and the Balkan States, ‘conditions on recognition’ that include a 
commitment to democratic governance.99 Additionally, restoration of democracy and the 
right of self-determination has figured prominently in the lawfulness of military action in 
the southern hemisphere. Today, many countries notably in the Third World consider a 
clean bill of health from foreign electoral observers as an important aspect of 
demonstrating their commitment and adherence to democratic ideals.
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The biggest stumbling block though in the move towards democracy as an entitlement is 
that both within the United Nations and regional organisations there is no special set of 
institutional procedures for handling interruptions in democratic governance, much less 
for addressing undemocratic regimes generally. As a result, any effort to promote 
democracy through the political organs of the United Nations is subject to all the vagaries 
of United Nations politics. The procedures within regional organisations are little better. 
The Moscow and Copenhagen documents commit the member states, morally if not 
legally, to ‘defend and protect’ the ‘democratic order’ in any participating state against a 
violent overthrow.100 But the steps to be taken are not specified, not even to the extent of 
outlining the institutional procedures to be followed to determine what those steps should 
be. Although one author has argued that the Copenhagen Document implicitly authorizes 
military intervention to protect democracy,101 it seems unlikely that the signatories would 
interpret it this way. 
Despite acknowledgment of democracy as an entitlement there exist minimal international 
and regional procedures for responding to unconstitutional seizures of power and flawed 
elections. Steps to be taken are not specified with regional and international efforts 
constrained by the non-intervention provisions of the Charter of the United Nations102 and 
continued opposition of states to anything that might open the door too widely to 
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    See: ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension.’ 29 June 1990. (1990) 29 ILM, 1305 at 1309 mandating that the 
participating states defend democracy; Cf. ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
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intervention in internal affairs. There is simply no consensus, within regional and other 
international organisations, on strengthening significantly their institutional capacity to 
promote democracy. Any substantial departure from present practice must survive the 
critical scrutiny of veto-wielding states such as China and Russia103 as well as potentially 
hostile regional blocs in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. As a result of differences 
among states, departures from democratic principles are likely to prompt a significant 
collective international response only in exceptional circumstances. On rare occasions, as 
in Haiti, it may prove possible for states to agree on collective measures to restore the 
ousted government to power,104 but in general, easy cases of the sort represented by Haiti 
continue to be very few and far between.
CONCLUSION
The normative basis for the right to democracy is discerned in the historical development 
of human rights law. There is a persuasive case to be made for a democratic tradition in 
international law. 
‘Even the strongest critics of democracy are not denying the value of the concept, but rather 
they are cautious about accepting it blindly and ignoring the consequences and other 
potentially valid ideological perspectives.’105
103
   See: Charter of the United Nations art 23, para 1 listing the permanent Security Council Members, 
which include China and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
104
    See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, UN SCOR, 49th sess, at 
3, UN Doc S/1994/828 (1994).
105
    Barnes, R. ‘Book Review, “Democratic Governance and International Law”’ (2000) 8 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 281 at 297.
28
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is the premier instrument on the right to 
democracy, and it contains the clearest statement on the issue of democracy.106 While 
General Assembly resolutions are often regarded as not binding,107 it must be noted that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not just another General Assembly 
Resolution. ‘It has become an edifying referent for state constitutions, whose contents 
sometimes are a wholesale adoption of provisions of the Universal Declaration.’ 108
Beyond state boundaries, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has inspired 
regional and international agreements.109 The influence of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights on subsequent international and regional developments regarding 
democratic governance is testament that it has effectively shed whatever stigma attended 
the circumstances of its birth. The eminence of the declaration is evident in its 
endorsement as a reflection of customary international law.110 In fact the UN observes that 
the broadest legally binding human rights agreements, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights111 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
106 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 21.
107 The conclusion that the resolutions are mere recommendations is based on narrow logic. If the 
fundamental principles of the United Nations are collectivism and sovereign equality, then one must 
concede at least that resolutions carry the moral force of the opinions of most sovereign states. The 
General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR, 5th sess., Supp. No. 
20, 302d plen. Mtg, [10]-[12], U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) demonstrated the residual legal capacity of the 
General Assembly. In any event, there can be no better evidence of a general practice accepted as law 
than the resolutions of states reached in the most widely representative and democratic organ of the 
United Nations, and in the course of discussing issues under the Charter, which, juridically, is the 
constitution of the United Nations.
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Political Rights112, have ‘take[n] the provisions of the Universal Declaration a step further 
by making them binding upon States parties’.113
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasises the overriding 
importance of the will of the people.114 Therefore, a government that is not based on the 
consent of the governed is not democratic. In addition, the government must be 
substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country. It follows that 
representation should be manifest in active as opposed to nominal participation such that 
‘representation and participation (are) experienced as part of a continuum’.115  To be 
legitimate and democratic in international law, the emerging government must be based 
on the consent of the people and must be participatorily representative of all national and 
distinct political groups in the country.
There has been relatively broad (though by no means uniform) acceptance of the principle 
that elections should entail competition among multiple political parties - something 
Soviet-bloc states rejected for years.116 Additionally, substantial international agreement 
now exists on many of the procedural and substantive prerequisites for free and fair 
elections.117
112 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 
ILM 368.
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‘Elections, however, are only part of any democratic system. They may assist in the formation 
of a government responsive to the popular will, but they do not guarantee such a government. 
In many countries, systemic problems override the positive effects of free elections. In a 
number of Latin American states, for example, entrenched militaries, powerful business elites, 
lopsided patterns of resource distribution, and a history of human rights abuses all sharply 
constrain the ability of elected governments to alter existing political relations’.118
In some countries, in Europe and elsewhere, the problem is just the opposite: elections 
result in governments that are too responsive to the popular will of an ethnic majority, and 
insufficiently attentive, or openly hostile to, minority group interests.119 In still other 
countries, elected governments abandon democratic principles after attaining office.120
Acceptance and entrenchment of democracy involves the infusion of democratic social 
organization in key state mechanisms besides the current over reliance on formal 
procedural democratic processes as the benchmark. Concern with furthering democracy 
requires going beyond the procedural motions of democracy, such as universal suffrage, to 
the realization of democracy in substance. While formal mechanisms may constitute 
necessary components of a democratic society, they fall far short of being sufficient in 
achieving the substance of democracy.
For all the discourse surrounding the notion of democratic governance, there is as yet no 
broad consensus about what the notion means, what the content of it is and whether it 
exists as a basic legal entitlement for the citizenry necessitating enforcement (by whatever 
means available) by the international community. Naturally states are skeptical about 
118
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recognizing that international law has fully recognized and incorporated an all-
encompassing notion of democracy. This is especially so in view of the fact that 
conceptions of democracy developed by way of treaties and General Assembly 
Resolutions are notably open ended, part of the legacy of the Cold War polarization of 
democratic forms with both East and West claiming democracy, but sharply differing on 
ideological and substantive grounds. The end of the Cold War saw the ascendance of 
liberal democracy as the basis of a new world order but this ascendance is seen as 
strengthening a restrictive practice of democracy and threatening to the recognition of 
democratic heterogeneity. The developing world is especially wary of the new world 
order democratic discourse which is seen as promoting a conservative and protective form 
of liberal democracy hostile to the evolution of other popular and participatory democratic 
processes and thus part of a subtle Western expansionist agenda.
Though at both the international and regional level democracy has been recognised as an 
international norm, support for democracy is still expressed in general terms with no 
clear-cut international consensus existing as to the criteria that should be used to judge 
whether or not a particular government is substantively ‘democratic’.121 In part, this is 
because many states still do not share the West’s enthusiasm for liberal, parliamentary 
democracy. Some states, in particular Islamic and Asian states, view much of the recent 
rhetoric about democratic governance as a misplaced attempt to transplant western 
institutions and structures of governance to countries with radically different cultural and 
121
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political traditions. 122  In their view, any attempt to impose a western blueprint for 
democracy constitutes nothing short of cultural imperialism.123
Even within regional systems with a relatively strong commitment to democratic 
government, evaluation of actual cases may prove very difficult. 124  The problem is 
particularly acute in the case of new or emerging democracies attempting to overcome a 
long legacy of authoritarian mismanagement in a climate of economic decline and 
political instability.125 In the states of the former Soviet Union, for example, it is relatively 
easy to make judgments about whether national elections have been fairly conducted.126
Even when states can agree on the character of a particular state’s government, they may 
disagree strongly on the approach the international community should take to dealing with 
that government.127 Many states remain firmly convinced that the character of a state’s 
government is fundamentally a matter of domestic concern.128 Some states, however, 
acknowledge that democratic governance has become a subject of international 
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commitments and therefore of international concern, but believe strongly that change 
should be effected through dialogue and negotiation rather than through any other more 
pragmatic measures.129
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